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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Order and Judgment appealed from was signed on September 17,2004, 
and entered on September 20,2004. Defendant-appellant GMAC Commercial 
Mortgage Corporation filed its Notice of Appeal on October 14,2004. The Utah 
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) because this appeal involves the review of an order of a trial 
court over which the Utah Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction. This 
Court has jurisdiction because this is a case transferred to this Court from the 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether a party who holds a valid and perfected security interest and asserts a 
superior priority when litigation is commenced, must file a UCC continuation 
statement during the course of the litigation in order to continue to assert priority 
against the adverse party. 
Standard of Review: To the extend that there are no facts in dispute this issue 
presents a legal question that should be reviewed for correctness without deference to 
the trial court's ruling. Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322,326 (Utah 1992). To the extent that 
there were facts in dispute on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court 
must "accept the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving] 
party." SME Industries. Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett Stainback & Assocs.. Inc., 2001 
UT 54, If 9,28 P.3d 669 (citing Wineear v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104,107 (Utah 
1 
1991)). Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. 
(citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) and Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 2001 UT 25,1f 32,21 P.3d 198). 
Determinative or applicable cases, statutes, and rules are: The Travelers 
Insurance Co. v. First National Bank of Blue Island, 621 N.E.2d 209 (111. Ct. App. 
1993); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. United States, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19263, at *5 
(E.D.Va. March 3,1978); Avant Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas, BP North 
America Petroleum Inc., 853 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1988). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THAT THE ISSUE WAS 
PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT 
This issue was properly raised in the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
that defendant-Appellant GMAC Commercial Mortgage filed in the trial court. (R. 
899-902.) This issue was also raised in the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by 
the plaintiff LaSalle Bank National Association. (R. 802-807.) The trial court ruled 
on this issue in a written opinion. (R. 1864-1868). 
A STATUTE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
TO THIS APPEAL 
(3) Except as provided in Subsection (6), a filed financing 
statement is effective for a period of five years from the 
date of filing. The effectiveness of a filed financing 
statement lapses on the expiration of the five-year period 
unless a continuation statement is filed prior to the lapse. 
If a security interest perfected by filing exists at the time 
insolvency proceedings are commenced by or against the 
debtor, the security interest remains perfected until 
termination of the insolvency proceedings and thereafter 
2 
for a period of 60 days or until expiration of the five-year 
period, whichever occurs later. Upon lapse, the security 
interest becomes unperfected, unless it is perfected 
without filing. If the security interest becomes 
unperfected upon lapse, it is considered to have been 
unperfected as against a person who became a purchaser 
or lien creditor before lapse. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-403 (1997).1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 1,1997, GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corporation 
("GMACCM") entered into a Master Lease Agreement with Qinn, Ltd. ("Qinn"), 
pursuant to which GMACCM agreed to purchase certain personal property (the 
"Equipment") that Qinn would rent from GMACCM, in exchange for rent payments 
that Qinn agreed to pay directly to GMACCM. The Lease further provides that, in 
order to secure Qinn's promise to make rent payments for the Equipment, GMACCM 
would take a present and continuing purchase money security interest ("PMSI") in the 
Equipment. On December 23,1997, GMACCM recorded a UCC-1 Financing 
Statement describing the Equipment and thereby created a perfected PMSI in the 
Equipment that was superior in priority to the blanket security interest held by LaSalle 
Bank National Association ("LaSalle") in Qinn's real and personal property. 
1
 The provisions of UCC Article 9 in effect as of December 1997, are the 
applicable authorities because the current Article 9 provides: "If the relative priorities 
of the claims were established before this act takes effect [July 1,2001], former 
Chapter 9 determines priority." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-709(l). The relative 
priorities between GMACCM and LaSalle were established on December 23,1997 -
the date that GMACCM filed its UCC-1 Financing Statement (R. R. 864,1f 4; R. 
1255, fC;R. 1390, f 2(v)). 
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On July 1, 2002, after Qinn fell into insolvency and defaulted on its obligations 
to LaSalle and GMACCM, LaSalle commenced this lawsuit seeking the appointment 
of a receiver and foreclosure on all of Qinn's property, including the Equipment. 
LaSalle also asking the trial court to declare that LaSalle's blanket security interest in 
all of Qinn's property was superior to the security interests of GMACCM and others. 
At the time the complaint was filed, GMACCM's purchase money security interest in 
the Equipment was perfected and it was superior in priority to LaSalle's blanket 
security interest. This fact was conceded by LaSalle below. (R. 2003, Tr. page 15, 
lines 11 thru 14 ("July 2002 is when the litigation gets filed. So as pointed out by 
counsel [for GMACCM], as of the date the complaint is filed, GMAC has the oldest 
filed UCC-1, LaSalle has the junior perfected security interest."); see also R. 1256 
(where LaSalle concedes in its brief that "[i]t is true that GMAC's PMSI used to be 
perfected" as of the date the complaint was filed)). 
Six months after the commencement of this lawsuit, on December 23,2002 (at 
the five-year anniversary of the filing of GMACCM's Financing Statement), 
GMACCM did not file a UCC continuation statement to renew its Financing 
Statement. Even though this event occurred after the commencement of this lawsuit, 
LaSalle advanced it as the basis for LaSalle's argument on summary judgment that 
the trial court should declare LaSalle's blanket security interest to be superior to 
GMACCM's PMSI in the Equipment. GMACCM opposed LaSalle's motion for 
summary judgment and filed a cross-motion citing authorities which hold that a party 
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should not be required to file a continuation statement in order to maintain its priority 
after this litigation was commenced. 
On September 17,2004, the trial court ruled on LaSalle's and GMACCM's 
cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted LaSalle's motion and 
denied GMACCM's cross-motion. This appeal seeks review of the trial court's grant 
of LaSalle's motion and denial of GMACC cross-motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With one exception noted below, the following facts were not disputed before 
the trial court: 
LaSalle's Blanket Security Interest in The Real and Personal Property 
Located at Ohm's Holiday Inn Airport Hotel 
1. As of November 1,1996, Qinn was the owner of certain real and 
personal property located at 5575 West Amelia Earhart Drive in Salt Lake City, Salt 
Lake County, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 823,118; R. 863.) 
2. On November 1,1996, Qinn executed and delivered to LaSalle's 
predecessor-in-interest a Promissory Note for the principal amount of $6,370,000 (the 
"Note"). (R.821,f2;R.863.) 
3. To secure payment of the indebtedness evidenced by the Note, on 
November 1,1996, Qinn, as Trustor, executed and delivered to LaSalle's predecessor-
in-interest, as Beneficiary, a Deed of Trust, Security Agreement, Assignment of Rents 
and Fixture Filing (the "Deed of Trust"). (R. 823, f 19; R. 863.) 
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4. The Deed of Trust was recorded on November 1,1996, describing and 
constituting a first lien on the Property and the improvements described therein 
known as the Holiday In Airport, and all furniture, furnishings, fixtures, goods 
inventory and personal property located thereon. (R. 824,1f 20; R. 863.) 
5. In addition to the Deed of Trust, Qinn executed and delivered to 
LaSalle's predecessor-in-interest a separate Security Agreement, dated November 1, 
1996 (the "Security Agreement"). (R. 830, f 52; R. 863.) Under this Security 
Agreement, as additional security for the loan evidenced by the Note, Qinn granted to 
LaSalle's predecessor-in-interest a security interest in the Collateral (as therein 
defined), including to all improvements, buildings and other structures now or 
hereafter situated on the Property, and all inventory, personal property, fixtures, 
appliances, goods, deposits, accounts and accounts receivables. (R. 831, f 53; R. 
863.) 
6. A UCC-1 Financing Statement evidencing the security interest held by 
LaSalle's predecessor-in-interest in the Collateral was filed in the Office of the Utah 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code and recorded on November 1,1996. 
(R.831,f 54; R. 863.) 
7. On November 1,2001, LaSalle's November 1996 UCC-1 Financing 
Statement lapsed. (R. 1673, f 3.) LaSalle filed a new UCC-1 Financing Statement on 
January 23,2002 (R. 1673, % 4), and again on March 19,2003. (R. 1673,18.) 
6 
GMACCM Maked a Loan Allowing Qinn to Purchase 
Additional Personal Property 
and 
GMACCM Acquired a Perfected Purchase 
Money Security Interest 
8. On or about December 1,1997, GMACCM entered into a Master 
Equipment Lease Agreement (the "Lease") with Qinn for approximately a 54-month 
period. (R. 864, 1 1; R. 1254, 1 A; R. 1390, J 2(i)). 
9. Pursuant to the Lease, GMACCM agreed to purchase certain personal 
property consisting of hotel furniture, fixtures and equipment (collectively the 
"Equipment") that Qinn would, in turn, lease from GMACCM, in exchange for rent 
payments that Qinn agreed to pay directly to GMACCM! (R. 864, 1 2; R. 1255, 1 Bl 
R. 1390,12(1)). 
10. The Lease further provides that, in order to secure Qinn's promise to 
make rent payments for the Equipment, GMACCM would take a present and 
continuing security interest in the Equipment. (R. 864,13; R. 1255,1B; R. 1390,1 
2(H)). 
11. GMACCM filed and recorded a UCC-1 Financing Statement (the 
"Financing Statement") on or about December 23,1997 with the State of Utah 
Department of Commerce Division of Corporations & Commercial Code. (R. 864, f 
4; R. 1255, f C; R. 1390,12(v)). 
12. The Financing Statement contains a detailed description of all of the 
Equipment that GMACCM purchased and subsequently leased to Qinn. (R. 864,15; 
R. 1255, IB; R. 1390,12(vi)). 
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13. GM ACCM filed the Financing Statement within 20 days of the time at 
which Qinn took possession of the Equipment. (R. 864, 1 6 (referencing the Affidavit 
of Laurie Bivona (R. 891-894); and R. 1390, ffl 2(iii) & 2(iv) (referencing the 
Affidavit of John Hopkins (R. 1316-1386)). LaSalle disputed this fact but did not 
offer any evidence suggesting to the contrary. (R. 1255, J D.) The trial court did not 
see this fact as being seriously contested. (R. 1758 (noting in its Minute Entry that 
"Factually there is no dispute.")) 
14. On or about June 1,2002, the Lease between GMACCM and Qinn 
expired by its own terms (approximately 54 months after its execution on December 
1,1997). (R. 1389,1 l(i)). 
15. Paragraph 18 of the Lease requires Qinn to return the Equipment to 
GMACCM at the end of the term. (R. 1389,1 l(iii)). 
16. GMACCM did not file a continuation statement to renew its Financing 
Statement on December 23,2002 - the five-year anniversary of the filing of the 
Financing Statement. (R. 1389, f 1.) 
17. On August 18,2003, GMACCM re-perfected by filing a new UCC-1 
Financing Statement. (R. 1674,113.) 
The Commencement of this Litigation and 
Relevant Procedural History 
18. LaSalle filed its Complaint on July 1,2002. (R. 1.) LaSalle's 
Complaint alleges mat GMACCM's PMSI is "junior in time, subordinate and inferior 
to the right, title and interest of [LaSalle] in and to the [Equipment] by reason of 
8 
[LaSalle's] Deed of Trust." (R. 12, f 59.) LaSalle claimed that GMACCM's security 
interest in the Equipment is subordinate and inferior to LaSalle's security interest 
therein primarily because LaSalle recorded and filed its security interest first-in-time. 
(R. 12,159 (Complaint); R. 864, f 7; R. 1255,1f B.) 
19. In its Complaint, LaSalle also asserts a cause of action seeking "the 
immediate appointment of a receiver of the Property, without regard to the value 
thereof or the solvency or financial condition of defendant Qinn, to enter upon and 
take possession of and to preserve, safeguard, control, and manage the Property, and 
prevent waste therefrom, and to collect and receive all of the Rents therefrom." (R. 
14, % 76 (Complaint)). 
20. On September 18,2002, GMACCM answered LaSalle's Complaint and 
asserted that GMACCM held a superior interest in the Equipment based on 
GMACCM's Lease with Qinn and GMACCM's Financing Statement. (R. 283, f 59.) 
21. On October 30,2002, LaSalle made a motion to the trial court seeking 
the appointment of a receiver under Rule 66, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to take 
possession and control of the Property, including the Equipment that GMACCM 
purchased for Qinn that is pledged as security to GMACCM. (R. 379-384; & 348-
378.) 
22. On February 28,2003, LaSalle filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment seeking an order allowing the foreclosure of its Deed of Deed and security 
interests, and appointing a receiver. (R. 802-807; R. 1673, % 7.) As regarding 
GMACCM's interest in the Equipment, LaSalle asked the trial court to enter a 
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judgment decreeing that "none of the defendants" are entitled to possession of the 
Equipment and that the defendants' interests in the Equipment is "subordinate, junior 
and inferior to the right, title and interest of LaSalle therein pursuant to the Deed of 
Trust." (R. 804, \ 5.) 
23. On April 2,2003, GMACCM filed an opposition to LaSalle's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 861-890.) GMACCM's opposition was 
supported by the Affidavit of Laurie Bovina and the Affidavit of John Hopkins. (R. 
861-890, 891-894, & 1316-1386). At the same time, GMACCM also filed a Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment against LaSalle. (R. 899-902, & 861-890.) 
24. On April 10,2003, Qinn filed an opposition to LaSalle's motion for 
partial summary judgment. (R. 903-1252.) Qinn's opposition was supported by two 
Affidavits of Meredith K. Palmer (R. 921-924, & 1248-1252), and one Affidavit of 
Richard Pearson. (R. 925-1247.) 
25. On July 28,2003, at the time set for the hearing on the LaSalle's and 
GMACCM's cross-motions, Qinn appeared through counsel and announced that it 
had filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (case no. 0332764). Without hearing 
argument, the trial court ordered: * 'This matter is stayed, as to the parties present, 
pending the outcome of the Federal Bankruptcy matter." (R. 1400.) The parties 
present were Qinn, LaSalle, and GMACCM. (Id.) 
26. On August 21,2003, the trial court entered an Order Concerning 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and for Appointment of a Receiver, which 
provided, in part: "With the commencement of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case by 
10 
QINN, the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) bar the continuation of any 
further action against QINN in this proceeding, subject to entry of an order by the 
Bankruptcy Court lifting or modifying the automatic stay." (R. 1402.) 
27. On September 23,2003, the trial court entered an Order for 
Appointment of Receiver whereby the trial court appointed Kenneth L. Edwards to be 
"receiver of the Property during the pendency of this action or until further order of 
this Court." (R. 1412, f 2.) The Receiver was given all of the authority commonly 
given to a receiver, such as the power to take custody of the Property, operate the 
Property, collect rents, etc. (R. 1412-1419.) 
28. On April 30,2004, following a ruling from the bankruptcy court that it 
would abstain from hearing the issues raised in GMACCM's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment, GMACCM filed a Sur-Reply In Support of its Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment and asked the trial court to rule on this motion in GMACCM's 
favor. (R. 1620-1631.) 
29. On May 27,2004, LaSalle filed a Notice to Submit for Decision asking 
the trial court to rule on LaSalle's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect 
to GMACCM. (R. 1682-1684.) 
30. On July 6,2004, the trial court heard oral arguments on LaSalle's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and GMACCM's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 1688,1731, Transcript of Hearing on July 6,2004 ("Tr."), R. 2003.) 
31. On July 28,2004, the trial court entered a Minute Entry denying 
GMACCM's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1758-1761.) 
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32. On August 25,2004, GMACCM filed a written objection to a portion of 
the proposed Order and Judgment submitted by LaSalle. (R. 1788-1792.) 
33. On September 17,2004, the trial court entered a Minute Entry 
sustaining GMACCM's objection to a portion of the proposed Order and Judgment. 
(R. 1862-1863.) On the same date, the trial court signed the Order and Judgment 
(modified by striking the portion that GMACCM objected to) granting summary 
judgment to LaSalle and against GMACCM. (R. 1864-1868.) 
34. On October 14,2004, GMACCM filed its Notice of Appeal seeking 
review of the trial court's Order and Judgment entered on September 17,2004. (R. 
1897-1896.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHEN THIS LAWSUIT WAS COMMENCED, GMACCM'S 
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST WAS SUPERIOR 
TO LASALLE'S NON-PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY 
INTEREST. 
It is well established that a perfected purchase money security interest 
("PMSI") takes priority over a conflicting, non-purchase money security interest that 
was perfected on an earlier date. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-312(4) (1997)2; Meyer v. 
General Am. Corp.. 569 P.2d 1094,1098-99 (Utah 1977). A PMSI becomes 
2
 The provisions of UCC Article 9 in effect as of December 1997, are the 
applicable authorities because the current Article 9 provides: "If the relative priorities 
of the claims were established before mis act takes effect [July 1,2001], former 
Chapter 9 determines priority." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-709(l). The relative 
priorities between GMACCM and LaSalle were established on December 23,1997 -
the date that GMACCM filed its UCC-1 Financing Statement. (R. R. 864, % 4; R. 
1255, H C;R. 1390, K2(v)). 
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"perfected" when the secured party files a financing statement for the equipment at 
issue at any time prior to 20 days after the debtor takes possession of the equipment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-312(4) (1997); see also First Interstate Bank of Utah v. 
Internal Revenue Serv., 930 F.2d 1521,1525 (10th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the PMSI 
as an exception to the "first-to-file" rule). 
In this case, it was beyond dispute below that GMACCM filed its Financing 
Statement within 20 days of the time at which Qinn took possession of the 
Equipment. (R. 864, % 6 (referencing the Affidavit of Laurie Bivona (R. 891-894); 
and R. 1390, ffl 2(iii) & 2(iv) (referencing the Affidavit of John Hopkins (R. 1316-
1386)). In fact, at the hearing, LaSalle's counsel conceded that GMACCM held the 
superior priority over LaSalle in the Equipment on the date the complaint was filed. 
(R. 2003, Tr. page 15, lines 11 thru 14 ("July 2002 is when the litigation gets filed. 
So as pointed out by counsel [for GMACCM], as of the date the complaint is filed, 
GMAC has the oldest filed UCC-1, LaSalle has the junior perfected security 
interest."); see also R. 1256 (where LaSalle concedes in its brief that "[i]t is true that 
GMAC's PMSI used to be perfected" as of the date the Complaint was filed)). The 
trial court did not see this fact as being contested. (R. 1758 (noting in its Minute 
Entry that "Factually there is no dispute.")) 
Thus, as of the date this lawsuit was filed by LaSalle on July 1,2002, 
GMACCM's PMSI was perfected and had priority over LaSalle's non-purchase 
money security interest. The issue presented to the trial court - and now on appeal -
is: Whether a party who holds a valid and perfected security interest and asserts a 
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superior priority when litigation is commenced, must file a continuation statement 
during the course of the litigation in order to continue to assert priority against a 
competing creditor. The trial court framed the issue like this: 
The issue the court is called upon to decide is whether 
pending litigation tolls the necessity to timely file a 
continuation statement - pursuant to Article 9 U.C.C. - in 
order to maintain priority of interest in personal property. 
The decision determines the parties' relative priorities 
with respect to certain equipment purchased with a loan 
fromGMAC. Factually there is no dispute. IfGMAC 
was required to file a continuation statement on its 
purchase money security interest, it has lost priority over 
LaSalle Bank. 
R. 1758 (Minute Entry, p. 1). The trial court's ruling on this issue is a legal question 
that is reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court's ruling. Estate 
Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 
P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992). For the reasons explained below, the trial court erred in 
holding that GMACCM was required to file a continuation statement after the 
commencement of the litigation in order to maintain its priority. 
II. THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE GMACCM TO FILE A 
CONTINUATION STATEMENT DURING THIS LITIGATION 
IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE PRIORITY THAT EXISTED 
WHEN THIS LAWSUIT WAS COMMENCED. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that GMACCM was required 
to file a continuation statement after the lawsuit commenced As noted above, 
GMACCM held a perfected PMSI that was superior to the interest of LaSalle in the 
Equipment at the time this lawsuit was commenced on July 1,2002. A party cannot 
rely on events that occur subsequent to the filing of its complaint as a basis to support 
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its claims. See United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Durbano Constr. Co. Inc.. 1444 F.R.D. 402, 
406-07 (D. Utah 1992) (holding that non-movant's argument based on evidence of 
conditions subsequent to those that existed at the time the complaint was filed was 
wholly without merit). 
Cases from other jurisdictions that have considered this factual situation have 
held that it is not necessary for competing creditors in a priority dispute to file a 
continuation statement once the litigation is commenced. A party who fails to file a 
continuation statement might lose its priority with respect to third-parties who are not 
part of the litigation, but, as between competing litigants, the claims to priority are 
fixed as of the date the lawsuit is commenced. All that remains is for the trial court to 
adjudicate those claims. There are three cases from other jurisdictions where courts 
were presented with the same or similar factual scenario of this case, and all three 
reached the same result. 
In The Travelers Insurance Co. v. First National Bank of Blue Island 621 
N.E.2d 209 (111. Ct. App. 1993), two creditors held competing security interests in the 
property of the debtor, a Holiday Inn franchisee. One secured creditor, Travelers, 
instituted an action to foreclose on its mortgage and security interests. After 
commencing the action, Travelers failed to file a continuation statement, its filing 
lapsed, and First National Bank, the competing secured creditor, filed a motion for 
summary judgment asking the court to declare that First National Bank had priority 
over Travelers' security interest. The court ruled that the rights of the parties were 
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fixed as of the date the foreclosure action was filed, and Travelers was therefore 
entitled to priority notwithstanding the lapse of its filing. See id. at 215. 
In Chrysler Credit Corp. v. United States. 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19263, at *5 
(E.D.Va. March 3, 1978), the plaintiff had a perfected security interest in the debtor's 
property when the litigation was commenced, but the plaintiffs UCC-1 lapsed during 
the course of the litigation because no continuation statement was filed. The court 
held that the plaintiff was nonetheless entitled to priority. See id. The court 
explained that the purpose of filing is to give notice of the existence of a security 
interest, and, since the litigation itself provided notice of the plaintiffs security 
interest to all interested parties, there was no need to file a continuation statement to 
give additional notice. See id. 
In Avant Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas, BP North America Petroleum Inc., 
853 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second Circuit reached a similar result. In Avant 
two creditors claimed competing security interests in funds of the debtor. The debtor 
deposited the funds with the court and commenced an interpleader action to determine 
the creditors' respective rights. Paribas's security interest had priority over BP's, but 
Paribas's filing lapsed for failure to file a continuation statement after the debtor 
commenced the action. The court held that"' certainly the purpose of requiring the 
filing of a continuation statement would not be served with regard to existing 
creditors who already had notice of the creditor's perfected security interest and 
knowledge of the interpleader actions themselves on the date the interpleader actions 
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were filed.'" Id. at 145 (quoting the district court). Paribas was therefore entitled to 
priority notwithstanding the lapse of its financing statement. See id. 
The rationale of these cases applies here. GMACCM and LaSalle are the only 
claimants to the Equipment. By LaSalle's own admission, GMACCM had a perfected 
PMSI when LaSalle commenced its foreclosure action in this Court on July 1,2002. 
(R. 2003, Tr. page 15, lines 11 thru 14 ("July 2002 is when the litigation gets filed. 
So as pointed out by counsel [for GMACCM], as of the date the complaint is filed, 
GMAC has the oldest filed UCC-1, LaSalle has the junior perfected security 
interest."); see also R. 1256 (where LaSalle concedes in its brief that "[i]t is true that 
GMAC's PMSI used to be perfected" as of the date the complaint was filed)). 
LaSalle knew of GMAC's perfected PMSI when it filed its complaint, but 
nevertheless petitioned the trial court to declare that LaSalle's security interest had 
priority over GMAC's. (See R. 283, J 59.) GMACCM answered LaSalle's complaint 
and put LaSalle on notice that GMACCM held a PMSI in the Equipment that was 
superior to LaSalle's blanket security interest. (Id.) This put at-issue the contest 
between GMACCM's perfected PMSI and LaSalle's inferior blanket security interest 
as of the commencement of the lawsuit - almost a full six months before the 
purported expiration of GMACCM's Financing Statement. Filing a continuation 
statement in such a situation would serve no purpose, since the only parties with a 
claim in the Equipment were already before the Court, and already knew of each 
other's security interests and respective priorities. The trial court erred in failing to 
follow the reasoning and precedent established in Travelers, Chrysler, and Avant. 
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The trial court's holding requiring a party to file a continuation statement even 
though the issue is pending and ready to be decided produces an inequitable result 
because it causes forfeiture of rights that are lost only because the parties have been 
forced to wait for the court to make its decision. It is patently unreasonable for 
LaSalle, having admitted that GMACCM held a superior interest in the Equipment on 
the date it commenced this lawsuit, to prevail on a forfeiture theory when there was 
no dispute that GMACCM's PMSI in the Equipment was in place and superior to 
LaSalle's interest until the middle of the lawsuit. In order for LaSalle to assert its 
lapse argument, it must acknowledge GMACCM's ownership of and superior security 
interest in the Equipment prior to December 23,2002, which it expressly did below. 
(R. 2003, Tr. page 15, lines 11 thru 14; and R. 1256.) This reveals that LaSalle could 
not have possibly held a security interest superior to GMACCM's interest in the 
Equipment at the time LaSalle filed its Complaint. Accordingly, the trial court 
committed error when it ruled as a matter of law that LaSalle's security interest was 
superior to GMACCM's. 
In addition, the trial courts ruling fails to apply the plain language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-9-304(2) (1997)3 which provides that GMACCM's PMSI is 
3
 The provisions of UCC Article 9 in effect as of December 1997, are the 
applicable authorities because the current Article 9 provides: "If the relative priorities 
of the claims were established before this act takes effect [July 1,2001], former 
Chapter 9 determines priority." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-709(l). The relative 
priorities between GMACCM and LaSalle were established on December 23,1997 -
the date that GMACCM filed its UCC-1 Financing Statement. (R. R. 864, \ 4; R. 
1255,1JC;R. 1390, t2(v)). 
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automatically continued during the pendency of these proceedings. Id. ("If a security 
interest perfected by filing exists at the time insolvency proceedings are commenced 
by or against the debtor, the security interest remains perfected until termination of 
the insolvency proceedings and thereafter for a period of 60 days or until expiration of 
the five-year period, whichever occurs later.") In this lawsuit LaSalle sought and 
received the appointment of a receiver to take control of all of Qinn's property, 
including the Equipment that is the subject of GMACCM's PMSI. (R. 14,176; R. 
1412-1419.) With its request for, and appointment of, a receiver this lawsuit is an 
equitable insolvency proceeding at least in part. Thus, under the statute, GMACCM 
was entitled to rely upon its PMSI throughout these proceedings because the PMSI 
was perfected and superior to LaSalle's interest at the time this lawsuit was 
commenced. 
Finally, not only did GMACCM hold a PMSI in the Equipment at the time that 
LaSalle filed its complaint, but GMACCM also had the unchallenged contractual right 
requiring Qinn to return the leased Equipment to GMACCM at the expiration of the 
Lease, which occurred one month prior to the date LaSalle filed its Complaint. (R. 
1389, ffif l(i) & l(iii) (The Lease between GMACCM and Qinn expired on June 1, 
2002 - 54 months after its execution and one month before LaSalle commenced this 
litigation.)) No type of blanket security interest claimed by LaSalle can be used to 
defeat GMACCM's contractual right to have Qinn return the leased Equipment at the 
end of the lease's term. It was error for the trial court to have ignored this contractual 
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right, even if GMACCM's PMSI was properly deemed to have become unperfected 
when it was not renewed. 
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court and enter an opinion 
holding that GMACCM's PMSI in the Equipment is superior to LaSalle's interest. 
The Court should adopt the rule from Travelers, Chrysler, and Avant to hold that a 
party is not be required to file a continuation statement during the litigation in order to 
maintain its priority after the litigation has commenced. At minimum, the trial court 
should not have overlooked GMACCM's contractual right to have Qinn return the 
Equipment to GMACCM on June 1,2002, at the end of the Lease's term. 
CONCLUSION 
GMACCM respectfully requests that this Court enter an order reversing the 
opinion of the trial court, and enter an order holding that, under the facts of this case, 
GMACCM's right to possession of the Equipment is superior to any interest held by 
LaSalle. 
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Gabriel S.Clark (9150) 
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Tabl 
LASALLE BANK NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, ET.AL. 
V. 
GMAC COMMERCIAL CREDIT 
CORPORATION, ET. AL. 
The matter is before the court to consider GMAC Commercial Credit Corporation's 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. The motion was argued on July 6,2004 and taken under 
advisement. 
The issue the court is called upon to decide is whether pending litigation tolls the 
necessity to timely file a continuation statement- pursuant to Article 9 U.C.C.- in order to 
maintain priority of interest in personal property. The decision determines the parties' relative 
priorities with respect to certain equipment purchased with a loan from GMAC. Factually there is 
no dispute. If GMAC was required to file a continuation statement on its purchase money 
security interest, it has lost priority over LaSalle Bank. 
GMAC argues that the UCC filing is for the purpose of notification of interest in 
property. Pending litigation serves the same purpose as between the parties to the litigation. 
Further, where the issue has been considered elsewhere, GMAC's position has been supported.. 
LaSalle responds that to adopt defendant's position would create a judicial rule tolling 
neither supported by statute nor well advised. Indeed, the statute only recognizes (since repealed) 
a suspension of filing requirements during insolvency proceedings. Additionally, plaintiff asserts 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 020905904 
Judge Fratto 
1 
that those cases cited by GMAC are distinguishable, and there is authority to the contrary. 
Having considered the pleadings, arguments, and those cases cited, the court finds 
plaintiffs position more persuasive. Priority through timely filing is a statutory creature, and it is 
for the legislature to decide when its requirements are tolled. 
The U.C.C. filing accomplishes more than just notification. It is the procedure by which 
priority is determined. There is no priority except through the code and its filing requirements. 
Accordingly, the filing requirements were not tolled by the litigation. The motion is 
denied in that GMAC was required to file a continuation statement to maintain priority. 
Counsel for LaSalle should prepare and submit a proposed order. 
Dated this 28 
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No.020905904 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
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The Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion") of 
plaintiff LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee for the Registered Holders of Merrill 
Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1997-C1 
("LaSalle"), and the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (the "GMAC Summary Judgment 
Motion") of defendant GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corporation ("GMAC") having come on 
for hearing before this Court on July 6,2004, the parties being represented by and through their 
respective counsel, and the Court having issued a Minute Entry herein dated July 28,2004, and 
the Court being fully informed and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion is hereby granted. 
2. The GMAC Summary Judgment Motion is hereby denied, GMAC having failed 
to timely file a continuation statement on its security interest in the Hotel FF&E (as hereafter 
defined). 
3. Plaintiff LaSalle has a valid and perfected first priority security interest in and to 
the furnishings, fixtures, equipment and personal property located on and/or attached to the 
premises of the hotel property having an address of 5575 Amelia Earhart Drive in Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, Utah (the "Hotel FF&E"). 
4. That the lien of defendant GMAC in the Hotel FF&E is junior in time, 
subordinate and inferior to the lien, right and interest of plaintiff LaSalle in the Hotel FF&E. 
5. Supplementing the Judgment, Order foi^ppointment of Receiypi^tind Decree of 
Foreclosure and Order of Sale entered herpkr^y this Court on Septepib^r 22,2003 (the ft 
318764 l.DOC 
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"Judgment"), it is hereby ordered that plaintiff LaSalle mpycause a sheriffs sale of the Hojfcel 
FF&E to be conducted, by writ of execution or otherwise, at which sale plaintiff LaSaHe shall be 
entitled to credit bid up to the amount of the difference between the Judgment smn of 
$7,201,045.00 and the amount credit bid h/plaintiff LaSalle at the sheriff s^ale of the real 
property held on February 17, 2004 m'the amount of $6,047,787.00, phrs interest thereon, an 
further that upon sale by the sheriff of said Hotel FF&E that the proceeds thereof shall be 
distributed as follows: / / 
(a) tar pay the sheriffs costs and sale; / 
(b) / to pay plaintiff LaSalle or its attorneys the amount owing/lmder the 
Judgment, including any additional amoums hereafter determined to be owing; and 
/ (c) to pay any surplus to mt clerk of this court for distribution. 
This provision of this Order and Judgmrat allowing for a sheriffs execution sale of the Hotel 
FF&E is without prejudice to plaintiff LaSalle pursuing, as to all or>6ny portion of the Hotel 
YF&E if plaintiff chooses, one^ or more non-judicial dispositions/or non-judicial foreclosures 
under the provisions of Revised Article 9 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
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DATED this _[_[ day of Jtdgist, 2004 
BYT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
0>° ^Of^O^ 
David W. Tufts 
Durham, Jones & Pinegar 
Stanley A. Seymour 
Kilpatrick Stockton LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant GMAC Commercial 
Mortgage Corporation 
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